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Abstract
The long-term sluggish stock market of China has got 
rooted in the current Chinese securities law and regulatory 
practice which fail to give an appropriate consideration to 
promoting efficiency, competition, and capital formation 
while focusing on maintaining the social and economic 
order and the public interest superficially and protecting 
investors nominally. Based on the provisions of the 
current Chinese securities law, the sluggish stock market 
mainly comes from the failure to integrate such three 
components of securities law as the public disclosure 
(especially IPO) system, the fiduciary system and the 
liability (especially civil liability) system, or rather it is 
mainly due to the unfair offering system, the inadequate 
civil liability system and the insufficient fiduciary system. 
Thus, correspondingly fundamental reforms are required 
in China.  
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INTRODUCTION
More than twenty years has passed for China’s securities 
market since the establishment of Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in December 1992. In terms of contributions, 
China’s securities market has played an undeniable role 
in maintaining the social and economic order and public 
interest, especially in promoting the development of the 
so-called socialist market economy. 1 As a result, a large 
number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have got rid 
of financial difficulties by initial public offering and 
listing after restructuring, while the stock market, though 
troubled with big problems, has taken an increasingly 
important role in China’s financial market. 
Anyway, for a long time, especially in the recent 
period, China’s securities market has remained sluggish 
and nearly everyone seems like a burnt child dreading fire 
when talking of the stock market. “China’s stock market 
is like a patient with lingering and serious diseases, which 
seem incurable with either traditional Chinese medicines 
or western medicines by regulators” (YUAN, 2004, p.2). 
Some scholars have become so disappointed that, as 
expressed by themselves, they would no longer do any 
research on China’s securities market. What is the cause 
of such problems in China’s stock market? In a legal 
view, it is the failure to integrate such three components 
of securities law as the public disclosure (especially IPO) 
system, the fiduciary system and the liability (especially 
civil liability) system, or rather it is mainly due to the 
unfair offering system, the inadequate civil liability 
system and the insufficient fiduciary system, which may 
be traced back in the fundamental economic system. 
 1 See the purposes of the securities law as provided for in Article 1 of the Securities Law of the PRC.
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1.  UNFAIR OFFERING SYSTEM
The fundamental cause of the problem of China’s sluggish 
stock market is the failure in the  process of public 
offering to obey the principles of “publicity, fairness and 
justice”2, the soul of the legal system of the securities 
market. Specifically, the relevant provisions of the 
offering system and practices are unfair in themselves. 
At the very beginning, China’s stock market witnessed a 
rapid development due to the alliance and participation of 
some local interested institutions and monopoly capital, 
where the participation of and control by powers had 
facilitated the progress of reforms. However, it is such a 
non-market development mode that has foreshadowed the 
long-term distortion of the fundamental system of China’s 
stock market. (YUAN, 2004, p.14). The stock market has 
consequently become the best funding source to rescue 
difficulty stricken SOEs as well as the place for officials 
to pursue private interests and seek rents. Eventually, 
among over 2,350 listed companies currently in Shanghai 
Stock Market and Shenzhen Stock Market the majority 
are SOEs. How could the stock market stand well where 
most of the shares sold and purchased were those of bad-
performance enterprises? 
The philosophy of securities law is publicity 
or disclosure, as “sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman 
(Brandeis, 1932, p.92)”. The securities law of almost 
every nation is designed around such core philosophy 
for ensuring the truthfulness and reliability of public 
disclosure. However, different ideas have formed different 
guiding thoughts in legislation, hence, the merit model 
and the disclosure model of securities regulation. As 
commented by Professor Stephen Bainbridge (April 
22, 2012), Wendy Gerwick Couture has identified the 
common complaints lodged against merit review (63 
Baylor L. Rev. 1):
[Merit review is] premised on the debatable notion that 
a security has an ascertainable fair price. In addition, by 
lowering offering prices below what the market will bear, 
[it will] divert money away from the issuer to be scooped 
up by speculators in the secondary market.
Other criticisms are also identified. First, merit review 
is widely criticized as unduly paternalistic. Second, merit 
review is often criticized for interposing an ill-equipped 
middleman (China Securities Regulatory Commission, or 
CSRC) between issuers and investors. Third, merit review 
is often maligned for preventing issuers from raising 
capital by denying them registration, hence unnecessarily 
constraining the freedom of people to do business as 
they see fit, discouraging entrepreneurial initiative and 
impeding the flow of capital to its most efficient use. 
Merit review has also been blamed for impeding 
capital formation. “Small issuers in particular complained 
bitterly that the cost of complying with California’s 
merit review standard in order to register their securities 
offerings for sale in this state substantially raised their 
capital formation costs. ” (30 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1573, 
1586)
In assessment of merit review in Chinese securities 
law, Robin Hui Huang suggested another problem with 
the merit review system that merit regulation had also 
provided a fertile breeding ground for rent seeking 
and corruption by regulators. This was because the 
approval requirement made the right to do an IPO a 
scarce commodity and thus leaded to many rent-seeking 
activities in the process. (41 Hong Kong L. J. 261, 270) 
Merit review had also been vehemently attacked in 
recent times for such problems in China as associated 
costs, indefiniteness, inconsistency and the potential 
for corruption. Finally, public regulators are unable to 
outperform the market in evaluating financial products. 
Furthermore, as commented by Professor Zhu Jinqing, 
“In practice, there are so many formalities in the offering 
process in China, and it may be said that China’s merit 
review is more than merit review.” (ZHU, 2009, p.95) As 
a result of such review, there are only a few non-state-
owned enterprises listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange since it is too hard for them to 
pass the mandatory review due to their lack of access to 
governmental relationship; and many high quality non-
state-owned enterprises can only go listing in overseas 
markets, including New Oriental, Baidu, Sina, Sohu and 
Mengniu.
Even with such excessive merit review, rent-seeking 
and corruption are so popular that fraud and false listings 
have never stopped, including the notorious scandals of 
Hongguang Industrial in 1997 to Green Land in 2011. 
Why fraud in offering is so popular with merit review? 
May a stock market become prosperous without quality 
enterprises? It is not a surprise that the Chairman of 
CSRC has recently doubted whether merit review could 
be discarded in IPOs or not. 
Such doubt is also hidden in the self-contradictory 
provisions of the Chinese securities law. The disclosure 
philosophy is reflected in Article 27 of the Securities Law 
of the PRC, i.e., caveat emptor, which is contradictory to 
the provision of Article 10 of the same law, a merit review 
standard practiced in China. 
We should say no to such merit review of Chinese 
characteristics. The disclosure philosophy should be 
realized consistently, or the registration system should be 
adopted, provided a complete civil liability system should 
be established and practiced, especially the system of civil 
liquidated damages. 
2 See Article 3 of the Securities Law of the PRC.
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2.   INADEQUATE CIVIL LIABILITY 
SYSTEM
Protection of investors is one of the purposes of securities 
law. How to protect investors without a complete 
responsibility system for violation in securities? Investors 
may lose their confidence in the stock market without 
proper protection. The public offering system of securities 
may not well operate without a complete responsibility 
system for violation in securities, and hence, the stock 
market may become a casino full of frauds. 
Especially, a complete civil liability system should be 
established and practiced. Only when investors may claim 
for liquidated damages conveniently through litigation can 
they become a positive market force to check violations 
including misrepresentation, misleading statements and 
material omissions. Under such civil liability system, 
responsible persons shall be liable and even go bankrupt 
once public disclosure is untruthful with loss to investors. 
In short, the cost for a lie in information disclosure shall 
be high enough. 
There are four types of responsibilities for securities 
violations, i.e., civil liabilities, administrative liabilities, 
criminal liabilities and self-disciplinary liabilities. Though 
the Chinese law has corresponding provisions, there is 
insufficiency to varying degrees. Among the four types 
of responsibilities for securities violations, civil liabilities 
should be in a dominant position, supplemented by 
administrative liabilities, criminal liabilities and self-
disciplinary liabilities, or in other word, damages shall 
be supplemented by punishment. Upon looking into the 
responsibility system of China’s Securities Law, it can 
be found that administrative punishment is in a dominant 
position. Among the total forty-eight articles of Chapter 
11 of China’s Securities Law nearly all provisions cover 
administrative punishment, and only four articles touch 
civil liquidated damages as ancillary.   
In terms of civil liabilities, there are twelve provisions 
in China’s Securities Law, with a wide coverage over 
untruth publicity by issuers, insider trading, market 
manipulation, fraud by securities firms, illegal operation 
of consulting agencies and illegal takeovers as well as 
disgorgement of unauthorized offerings. Such broad 
provisions on civil liabilities are forward looking to some 
extent. Since the truthfulness of disclosure in offering by 
issuers is at the core position in the operation of the entire 
securities market, the civil liabilities thereof are the core 
for securities violations.  
In reality, violations have become rampant in the stock 
market of China. With respect to civil liquidated damages 
in fraud cases of securities, the Supreme People’s Court 
issued two circulars in 2001 and 2002 and one judicial 
interpretation in 2003, which, though opened the doors 
to civil liquidated damages for securities violations step 
by step, still left various pre-conditions as obstacle to 
acceptance by courts of such cases. 
Market economy relies on its own adjustment 
mechanism and the play of the role of market force, 
where the supervision and punishment by government 
agencies may only play a residual function. Investors are 
the main market force to check falsification, promote due 
investigations by various types of persons responsible 
for publicity and guarantee the truthfulness in public 
disclosure by issuers by prosecuting wrongdoers in false 
statements for protecting their own legitimate rights 
and interests. However, the current Chinese system 
is like putting the cart before the horse. On one hand, 
governmental supervision is enhanced, and on the other 
hand, pre-conditions are set to prevent prosecution by 
investors, suppressing the underlying force of the market 
to check falsification and misrepresentation. That is the 
main cause for the problems of the stock market and the 
incomplete rule of law in securities, which is also the 
remaining obstacle to the civil litigation system. Some 
scholars even pointed out that the only backlog rested on 
courts, or rather the Supreme People’s Court (ZHU, 2009, 
p.174.). But, are courts authorized to allow investors to 
sue listed SOEs to die or would courts be willing to do so 
in China? 
Take for example, in the notorious Green Land, the 
court granted probation to all the five defendants and a 
fine of only RMB 4 million was imposed on the company. 
As commented by many people, the responsibility thereof 
is too light and the cost for breach is too low. In that case, 
even the People’s Procuratorate could not tolerate it, and a 
formal protest has been lodged.
Similarly, all those enterprises could not be tolerated 
that go listed for the sole purpose of fund-raising by use 
of various privileges including status and relations. A 
breakthrough may be made in reforms on the offering 
system only with the coordination by a complete system 
of civil liquidated liabilities. Certainly, the system of civil 
liquidated liabilities is only a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for the prosperity of a stock market. For a stock 
market to be prosperous, all the qualified enterprises, 
stated owned or privately run, shall have the opportunity 
to offer their shares in stock exchanges, that is, there shall 
be a fair offering system as mentioned above. 
3.  INSUFFICIENT FIDUCIARY SYSTEM
Also among the fundamental principles of the securities 
law is the fiduciary principle, or in essence, the fiduciary 
principle of professionals. Some scholar once commented 
that the fiduciary principle should be deleted from the 
Securities Law of the PRC because there were related 
provisions concerning to the good faith principle 
in the General Provisions on Civil Law of the PRC 
and the Contract Law of the PRC. That was clearly a 
misunderstanding. The fiduciary principle set forth in 
Article 4 of the Securities Law of the PRC has a special 
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meaning, which is in essence the fiduciary principle 
of professionals, totally different from the good faith 
principle. The fiduciary principle is one of the three pillars 
constituting the securities law, the other two pillars of 
which are publicity (including disclosure in IPOs and 
continuous disclosure) and liabilities (including civil 
liquidated damages). 
The fiduciary principle is different from the good 
faith principle in that as required by the latter, one 
should respect and promote (without harm at least) 
others’ interests and public interests while pursuing one’s 
own interests, and the former covers a separate legal 
category, including special relationships with and of 
agents, trust, partnerships, corporate officers, lawyers, 
accountants, securities service agencies (Tamar, 2011, 
p.42-62). As one of the three pillars of the securities law, 
the fiduciary principle and related rules and systems are 
mainly designated to supervise financial intermediaries 
or gate keepers including securities service agencies, 
directors, officers, controlling shareholders and actual 
controllers, which are also applicable to regulators and 
their staff members. The provisions on presumptive fault 
liabilities for securities service agencies and officers 
and senior management of issuers set forth in Article 69 
of the Securities Law of the PRC aim at enhancing the 
prosecution of liabilities, which reflects the requirements 
of the fiduciary principle. 
A sole principle is of no use without specific rules, 
systems and measures in its implementation and law 
enforcement. The problems of China’s stock market come 
from the unfair offering system and almost each case 
concerning securities offering is related to the frauds by 
intermediaries including securities firms, accountants and 
lawyers besides those by issuers and listed companies. 
The inadequate punishment against fiduciaries including 
intermediaries, directors and officers in the fraud listing 
cases of Hongguang Industrial and Green Land has 
indicated the shortage of legislation and enforcement in 
the fiduciary field of securities market. Furthermore, in 
Wang Xiaoshi, the hidden lover of Wang Xiaoshi, a staff 
member of CSRC sold the name list of reviewers involved 
in offering of securities for her private profits. That case 
indicated the rent-seeking phenomenon in the merit review 
system of China’s securities market, which was also the 
embodiment of the weakness in the current fiduciary 
system. The normal development and prosperity of the 
stock market of China is in urgent need of a complete 
fiduciary system. In such system, government teaches the 
whole people by its example. If the government becomes 
the lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every 
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. At 
emphasized by the Chairman of CSRC, CSRC should take 
a lead in the construction of the fiduciary system. 
The fiduciary principle is of three attributes, namely 
being subject to specific subjects, specific fields and 
specific rules. As required by the fiduciary principle, 
the act of the trustee shall be in the best interest of the 
beneficiaries, and the act of the trustee shall not be 
affected by its own interests or the interests in conflicts 
with those of the beneficiaries. Such requirement is 
higher than that of the good faith principle in civil law 
and contract law. The fiduciary duties are divided into 
the duty of loyalty and the duty of care, among which 
the duty of loyalty is related to the property and power 
entrusted and the duty of care is related to the quality 
and care of fiduciaries’ performance of their service. 
Based on the duty of loyalty are the duty to follow and 
abide by the directives of entrustment with respect to the 
entrusted power or property, the duty to act in good faith 
in performing fiduciary services, the duty not to delegate 
the fiduciary services to others, the duty to account and 
disclose relevant information to the entrustors, and the 
duty to treat entrustors fairly. The duty of care requires 
fiduciaries to execute their services and execute them 
well, and when executing services, fiduciaries shall 
stick to the following principles: fiduciaries should 
possess and use the expert skills they purports to possess, 
fiduciaries’ performance is evaluated by the process that 
the fiduciaries have adopted in performing their services, 
care may depend on the kind of “red flags” that the 
fiduciaries should failed to, notice, the duty if care may 
be affected by the legal risk imposed on the fiduciaries, 
the evaluation of the fiduciaries’ performance is affected 
by the reasonable expectations of the parties and the 
constraints on the fiduciaries’ discretion, the duty of 
care may vary depending on different applicable laws, 
and courts evaluate the performance of highly expert 
fiduciaries with the aid of other experts in the fiduciaries’ 
area. (Tamar, 2011, p.101-174.) In such regard, we need to 
revise China’s Securities Law and Securities Investment 
Fund Law so as to incorporate such requirements of the 
fiduciary principle.
CONCLUSIONS
To regulate the stock market and make it prosperous, the 
three pillars, or the three systems of offering, fiduciaries 
and civil  l iquidated damages must be combined 
organically for adopting an integral philosophy and 
systematical measures, and no isolated practice may reach 
the expected result of governance of the stock market. 
Recently, no measure is thoroughly complete in any 
of the above-mentioned three aspects though a series of 
highly technical measures have been adopted, including 
cracking down on insider trading, piecemeal reforms on 
the offering system, and emphasized opinions on fiduciary 
behaviors on the part of CSRC. 
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The securities market is a market ruled by law, and 
the securities market is an important national asset 
which must be preserved and strengthened3. If one of the 
historical purposes of China’s Securities Law were to 
rescue a number of difficulty-stricken SOEs and promote 
the institutional reforms of economy at the inception of 
the securities market, which has foreshadowed the long-
term twisted and sluggish development of the securities 
market, at present, we need to revise those purposes. 
In the coming revision to China’s Securities Law, the 
purposes of the securities law should be modified to 
include protection of the public interest and investors, 
and promotion of efficiency, competition and capital 
formation4. 
It is comforting to note that, on July 31, 2012, CSRC 
released the Interim Measures for Supervision and 
Administration of Fiduciary Conducts of Securities and 
Future Markets, indicating China is thinking over how 
to promote construction of the fiduciary system in the 
securities and futures markets in an integral measure, 
which may be of a far-reaching significance. However, 
in view of the content of the Interim Measures, it can be 
found that there is inadequate punishment against the 
violation of fiduciary standards, and that a set of complete 
ideas have not been formed on construction of the legal 
liability system for the fiduciary conducts of financial 
intermediaries (ZHANG Lu, 2012, p.A3).
It’s is easy to pretend that the sluggish securities 
market in China was caused by nothing more than 
regulation. But it wasn’t; it was, in large part, the result 
of a corruptly strong system of government power. And 
the securities market was a big part of that corruption 
of government power. Succinctly, the only way out for 
China to have a prosperous stock market is to integrate 
the fundamental reforms on the three systems of offering, 
fiduciaries and civil liquidated damages in the securities 
market. If such three systems are not complete, there 
would be no institutional safeguards for the further 
development of Chinese securities market, not to 
mention a healthy and prosperous securities market, and 
the expansion of the stock market and the launch of an 
international board would only be a mirage. 
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